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Harrigan and Spekkens give formal definitions for the wavefunction in quantum mechanics to be
ψ-ontic or ψ-epistemic, such that the wavefunction can only be one or the other. We argue that
nothing about the informal ideas of epistemic and ontic interpretations rules out wavefunctions
representing both reality and knowledge. The implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem
and many other issues need to be rethought in the light of our analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics describes the behaviour of sub-
atomic particles. Unlike classical mechanics, where par-
ticles are attributed particular values of position and mo-
mentum, quantum mechanics attributes wavefunctions,
which give probability amplitudes for possible values of
position, momentum and other observables. The prod-
ucts of the standard deviation of position and the mo-
mentum (and other pairs of incompatible observables)
have a minimum value given by the uncertainty principle
[1], but otherwise the situation seems similar to how a
probability distribution is used to represent incomplete
knowledge of a state. For example, probability functions
in classical statistical mechanics are used because, while
we do not know the exact state of all the particles in a gas,
we do know a lot about them on average - these probabil-
ity distributions reflect knowledge about the distribution
of particles over microstates. So, perhaps the wavefunc-
tion in quantum mechanics represents knowledge about
quantum particles (is epistemic) and does not represent
the real state of particles (is not ontic).
A very influential paper by Harrigan and Spekkens
gives formal definitions for the wavefunction being ψ-
ontic or ψ-epistemic, such that the wavefunction can only
be one or the other [2]. On the contrary, we argue that
nothing about the informal ideas of epistemic and ontic
interpretations or states rules out wavefunctions repre-
senting both reality and knowledge. If this is right then
the now standard definitions create a false dichotomy.
There are interpretations that are intended to be exclu-
sively epistemic, such as Fuch’s Quantum Bayesianism
(QBism), which treat the wavefunction as representing
knowledge about possible results, rather than a physical
state of the world [3, 4], or exclusively ontic, such as dy-
namical collapse theories [5][6]), Bohmian mechanics [7]
and Everett’s relative-state interpretation [8], which take
the wavefunction to represent something physical. How-
ever, this is no reason to define epistemic and ontic inter-
pretations exclusively, because the informal ideas do not
exclude each other, as the next section shows. The fol-
lowing sections explain Harrigan and Spekkens’s formali-
sation, and show how their definitions of ψ-ontology and
ψ-epistemicism simply presuppose that the wavefunction
cannot represent both knowledge and reality.
ONTIC AND EPISTEMIC INTERPRETATIONS
OF TERMS IN PHYSICAL THEORIES
Wavefunctions, like particle coordinates or vector
fields, are part of the mathematical apparatus of physi-
cal theory. Such a term in physical theory has an ontic
interpretation (is an ‘ontic state’) when it is taken to rep-
resent how the world is independently of our knowledge
of it to some extent or other.1 For example, the number
9.81 represents the acceleration due to gravity near the
surface of the Earth. It is not perfectly accurate and de-
pends on the conventional choice of units, but arguably
all representations are like this to some extent. Many
mathematical terms used in classical physics, whether
scalars, like mass or charge, or vectors, such as magnetic
field strength or linear momentum, are apt to be taken
as representing real physical properties.2
In his influential review of the PBR theorem, Matt
Leifer says that an ontic state represents ‘something that
objectively exists in the world, independently of any ob-
server or agent’ [12]. This is stronger than the definition
above because it rules out that the term also represents
our knowledge of the world as well. He gives the exam-
ple of the ontic state of a single classical particle being
its position and momentum.3
On the other hand, a term in physical theory has an
epistemic interpretation (is an ‘epistemic state’) when
it is taken to represent knowledge of the world to some
1 The terminology of ’ontic’ versus ’epistemic’ states is problematic
not only for the reasons we give, but it has become standard
among physicists working in quantum foundations.
2 Note that this is not to say that wavefunctions are physical
things, but that they represent something physical, just as the
correspondence between your fingers and the numbers one to ten
does not make the numbers themselves physical [9–11].
3 Leifer’s corresponding example of an epistemic state is then the
























extent or other. This seems a reasonable response to
the peculiarity of quantum mechanics - phenomena such
as contextuality, entanglement and collapse could in-
volve incomplete knowledge and Bayesian updating of
assigned probabilities. This has led to interpretations
of the wavefunction as representing only knowledge (as
in QBism, and also Ben-Menahem’s interpretation of
“quantum probabilities as objective constraints on the
information made available by measurement” [13]).
Simon Friedrich says a (ψ-)epistemic interpretation is
any view according to which “quantum states do not rep-
resent features of physical reality, but reflect, in some way
to be specified, the epistemic relations of the agents who
assign them to systems they are assigned to” [14]. So
he (and Leifer) agree that epistemic and ontic interpre-
tations are exclusive of each other, so that an epistemic
interpretation of a term rules out that the term repre-
sents the world as well (and this is so for Harrigan and
Spekkens too as explained in the next section). On the
other hand, our definitions do not make them exclusive
of each other (and the positive second part of Friederich’s
definition of a (ψ-)epistemic interpretation is very similar
to our definition of one).
In the case Leifer considers there is clearly a many-
one map between the epistemic state and the ontic state,
in the sense that many epistemic states are compatible
with the true state of the system (because there are many
probability distributions that give a non-zero probability
to a given state of the particle).
However, this is not so for the ontic state. Only one
mathematical representation is compatible with the un-
derlying state of the system, because the mathematical
representation of each possible microstate is a complete
specification of all the degrees of freedom of the system
over which the probability distribution is defined. As
the next section explains, Harrigan and Spekkens make
this difference between a many-one and one-one mapping
definitive of epistemic and ontic interpretations.
Not everything in physics is as straightforward as the
toy model Leifer considers, and it is not always clear
whether terms in physical theories represent real things
(for example, component versus resultant forces, gauge
etc.). In quantum mechanics individual particles do not
in general have their own pure quantum states. Noth-
ing about the idea of a determinate reality requires that
all physical states are decomposable into the states of
particles, and the states of quantum field theory do not
take individual particles to be the fundamental bearers of
physical properties. The probability distributions we get
from quantum mechanics are over eigenvalues associated
with observables, not over underlying states-of-the-world
as in classical statistical mechanics. For all these rea-
sons and more the framework and definitions of the next
section that have become orthodox are questionable.
FIG. 1. Harrigan and Spekkens’s ψ-epistemic (A) and ψ-
ontic (B) models of reality. Wavefunctions ψ and ϕ each have
probability distributions over state-space Λ = {λ}. In a ψ-
epistemic model, these can overlap over a subspace ∆, so a
state λ within this overlap could be represented by both ψ
and ϕ. However, in their formalism, in ψ-ontic models, each
state can only be represented by one wavefunction.
THE ONTOLOGICAL MODELS FRAMEWORK
Harrigan and Spekkens’s Ontological Models frame-
work considers how the wavefunction ψ relates to some
particular underlying real state of the world λ, from the
space Λ of possible such states [2, 15–18]. So under-
stood the wavefunction gives the relative (Born) proba-
bility pψA(S) that, upon measurement, a certain degree of
freedom (described by observable A) will have the spe-
cific value S (or range of values). It can be represented as
a normalised vector |ψ〉 in a Hilbert SpaceH, where there
is a complete orthonormal basis of vectors, correspond-
ing to possible values of A (with one or more vectors per
value, e.g. |S〉 for S).
In any hidden variable model, each observable A has
an associated response function A(S|λ), which gives the
probability for state λ that a measurement of variable A
would give an outcome in set S [10]. There is also p(λ|ψ),
the probability a situation described by wavefunction ψ is
in a given state λ (normalised over ψ’s support in state
space Λψ).
4 The framework assumes both of these are
probabilities (meaning both must be non-negative and
additive) rather than quasiprobabilities [19].5 This re-
4 The ’support’ of a probability distribution is the set of all the
values to which it assigns a non-zero probability.
5 Note, Harrigan and Rudolph extend this framework further by








Imagining our (arbitrary) observable A had the orig-
inal wavefunction |ψ〉 as a possible state after measure-
ment (i.e. |S〉 = |ψ〉), we find (as |〈ψ|ψ〉|2 = 1, and
p(λ|ψ) is normalised over Λψ [20])
∀λ ∈ Λψ, A(ψ|λ) = 1 (2)
If we now imagine a second possible wavefunction, ϕ,
with its own probability distribution p(λ|ϕ) over support















If ∆ > 0, this overlap of p(λ|ϕ) and Λψ is taken to
imply that the two wavefunctions in this model are epis-
temic states, because the same underlying state λ could
be represented by either depending on what it known
about the system.6 Harrigan and Spekkens take the ex-
istence of two distinct wavefunctions with overlapping
support within a model as necessary and sufficient for
that model being ψ-epistemic (and not ψ-ontic). The
idea is that, since the wavefunction is not determined by
the underlying state, so that two different wavefunctions
can represent it, some other factor must fix the wavefunc-
tion, and that factor is what is known about the system.
Harrigan and Spekkens claim all models that don’t
meet their criterion for being ψ-epistemic are ψ-ontic,
based on how, classically, states can be either ontic
(points on state space) or epistemic (probability distri-
butions on state space) as discussed above.7
Harrigan and Spekkens give three subcategories of ψ-
ontology. In the strongest (the ψ-complete model), the
wavefunction describes the system’s state completely and
no hidden variables are left out by it (as in Everettian in-
terpretations). In the other two models, both referred to
as ψ-supplemented, the state is supplemented by some
6 However, note, this doesn’t mean that they necessarily represent
the underlying state equally well - for a given λ in this overlap,
p(λ|ψ) needn’t equal p(λ|ϕ).
7 Schlosshauer and Fine apply the terms Mixed and Segregated to
these quantum models, rather than ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic [10],
which better characterises the divide in wavefunction overlap.
hidden variable - in the first as a one-to-one mapping be-
tween the wavefunction and the state; and in the second
where wavefunctions can map to more than one state
(but each state still only maps to one wavefunction).
While the wavefunction may not itself be the state, in this
framework, ψ-ontic models have each state correspond
to at most one wavefunction (see Fig. 1B), meaning all
wavefunctions have disjoint support in the state-space:
∀ψ,ϕ, s.t.ψ 6= ϕ; Λψ ∩ Λϕ =  (5)
ANALYSING HARRIGAN AND SPEKKENS’S
DEFINITIONS
In Harrigan and Spekkens’s framework, only ψ-
epistemic models allow multiple wavefunctions to over-
lap on the same underlying real state of the world (see
Fig. 1A). Although, given the assumptions of the On-
tological Models formalism, this is a sufficient condition
for a model being interpreted epistemically, it is not a
necessary one, because it is possible that knowledge is
included in the wavefunction but this one-to-one map-
ping still holds (i.e. ∆ = 0) - an epistemic model without
wavefunction overlap on state space.
An even broader condition would be that it is sufficient
for a model to be interpreted epistemically when the re-
sponse functions for individual λ within a wavefunction’s
support Λψ for a given variable A, aren’t equal to the
Born probability for the wavefunction for that variable:
∃{ψ, S,A}, s.t. ¬((A(S|λ) = pψA(S) ∀λ ∈ Λψ)
=⇒ ψ-epistemic
(6)
This condition implies the Born probability is just the
weighted average of response functions over Λψ, rather
than directly related to the specific λ representing the ac-
tual state of the world. All cases of overlap obey this con-
dition, as within Λψ, A(ψ|λ) = 1, but pϕA(ψ) = |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
which isn’t equal to 1 if ψ 6= ϕ. However, we can also
imagine cases without overlap obeying this condition for
an epistemic interpretation, as it applies to the response
function of any variable, rather than one giving a final
result of measurement of a system attributed the state ψ
whatever that is.
Harrigan and Spekkens’s criterion for a model being
ψ-ontic - that wavefunctions never have overlapping sup-
port in the space of undelying states - assumes it cannot
also be ψ-epistemic by definition.
ψ-ontic models, in their formalism, either take the
wavefunction to be the exact underlying state, or as rep-
resenting some reduced-information element of the state.
What they ignore is that this reduced-information repre-
sentation might need to be supplemented to get anything
usable as a wavefunction. This would imply a wavefunc-
tion could represent an element of reality at its core, but
also vary depending on additional factors - such as the
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knowledge of the observer. The wavefunction could rep-
resent both a part of the underlying state of the world,
and an observer’s knowledge of it. Wavefunctions repre-
senting different elements of reality could still be disjoint,
but, because of the supplementing factor (e.g. differing
knowledge), wouldn’t have to be.
Even assuming the Ontological Models Framework,
our above definition for an ontic interpretation of ψ just
requires that the Born probability pψA(S) depends some-
what on the underlying state λ. The only time this is not
the case is when any overlap of wavefunctions in state
space entirely corresponds to the inner product of those
wavefunctions - therefore
¬(∆(ψ,ϕ) = |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2, ∀ψ,ϕ)
=⇒ ψ-ontic
(7)
Leifer and Maroney, and separately Ballentine, have
proven that the only time this isn’t the case (when
∆(ψ,ϕ) = |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2, ∀ψ,ϕ) violates the Kochen-Specker
Theorem [21, 22] 8.
Since pψA(S) depending on λ (∆ not having to equal
|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2, ∀ψ,ϕ) doesn’t necessarily imply it is entirely
determined by λ (∆ being 0 ∀ψ,ϕ), it can meet the con-
ditions for being both ontic and epistemic.
Harrigan and Spekkens admit that all models that
aren’t ψ-complete could be said to have an epistemic
character, especially where multiple states map onto one
wavefunction, given this associates the wavefunction with
a probability distribution over state space. However, they
say they are instead interested only in pure quantum
states - hence their definitions being based on overlap,
given they claim, with pure states, “ψ has an ontic char-
acter if and only if a variation of ψ implies a variation of
reality and an epistemic character if and only if a varia-
tion of ψ does not necessarily imply a variation of real-
ity” [2]. Hardy agrees, saying, given no overlap between
the support of wavefunctions on the underlying state, we
could deduce the wavefunction from λ, which he takes
to mean the wavefunction would be written into the un-
derlying reality of the world [23]. However, this is ques-
tionable, given, as we said earlier, correlation between λ
and a wavefunction doesn’t necessarily make that wave-
function physical, any more than the correspondence be-
tween your fingers and the numbers 1-10 makes those
numbers physical [10] (which is why we earlier defined
wavefunction-ontic as the wavefunction representing the
real state, rather than being real itself).
Further, considering the wavefunction to be ontic if
and only if variation in it implies variation in the underly-
ing state ignores that, while ontic models require that the
8 Maroney refers to models where ∆ is always 0 as maximally ψ-
ontic and where ∆ is always |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 as maximally ψ-epistemic,
but says nothing about a general condition for a model being
ψ-ontic [20].
wavefunction represent an element of reality, they need
not only represent that. Even for pure states, so long as
we are not considering a ψ-complete model, there is al-
ways some factor supplementing the wavefunction in the
full underlying state of the world - so, conversely, knowl-
edge could supplement that representation of reality to
give us the wavefunction. Therefore, there is no reason
for change in wavefunction to imply change in reality in
an ontic model, even for pure states.
This is demonstrated by ψ-dependent models [10]. In
a ψ-dependent model, the response functions depends
on ψ - individual overlap possibilities for each possible
state are given by the relevant measurement probabili-
ties, rather than being uniform. The simplest case of
this is when pψ is uniform across Λψ, as, to retrieve the
Born probabilities, Aψ(S, λ) must then depend on ψ. As
the wavefunction still to some degree reflects the under-
lying state, these models are ontic in our sense. However,
they also allow overlap of wavefunctions on state space,
making them ψ-epistemic - Schlosshauer and Fine give
an ontic model which is also ψ-epistemic, also showing
models can be both.
CONSEQUENCES
In the light of the above we can create wavefunction-
epistemic models of the wavefunction which circumvent
no-go arguments typically applied to wavefunctions being
epistemic - such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR)
argument.
Pusey et al showed, given certain assumptions,
that any model that is ψ-epistemic by Harrigan and
Spekkens’s criterion (i.e. allows wavefunction-overlap
on state space) always contradicts quantum theory [24].
However, these assumptions (as given by Leifer [12]) as-
sume the definition of ψ-epistemic as the wavefunction
only representing knowledge about an underlying state.9
By taking the wavefunction to also represent elements
of reality, we can circumvent the PBR argument, while
still allowing overlap. For instance, we can do this by
9 The key assumption of Pusey et al’s argument, and other no-
go theorems aiming to prove the incompatibility of ψ-epistemic
models with quantum physics, is referred to as Preparation In-
dependence Postulate (PIP). This assumes that any two systems
prepared separately can be assumed not to have elements of their
underlying states correlated (that two separate states together
can just be represented by their tensor product). This is not
a trivial assumption [25] - it does not just rule out superdeter-
minism (non-causal correlations), but any correlation between
two separately-prepared subsystems. Given the underlying state
posited by the ontological models framework is that of the world,
rather than that of any individual system, and subsystems of-
ten have hidden correlations (off-diagonal density-matrix terms)
in quantum mechanics, we cannot arbitrarily say the extent to
which any two real systems are separable.
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creating models of the wavefunction like Schlosshauer
and Fine’s, where, due to ψ-dependence, overlap between
wavefunctions on state space can exist, but be set to go
to 0 when wavefunctions are orthogonal, avoiding PBR-
contradiction.
Alongside this, our sufficient condition for models be-
ing epistemic doesn’t require these models to allow wave-
function overlap on state space. This means, even if these
assumptions are valid, and so wavefunction overlap is in-
compatible with quantum physics, it wouldn’t necessarily
affect all epistemic models.
On our view, the wavefunction can represent both ele-
ments of reality as it is independently of us, and elements
of our knowledge of it. The PBR argument only rules out
models that have require both wavefunction overlap on
state space, and assumptions related to the wavefunc-
tion solely representing knowledge. The same applies for
other no-go theorems based on these definitions, such as
Colbeck and Renner’s [26], Patra et al’s [27], Hardy’s
[23], and Ruebeck et al’s [28].
CONCLUSION
Even in the ontological models framework, models can
be simultaneously ontic and epistemic - the wavefunction
can represent both elements of reality, and elements of an
observer’s knowledge about that reality. Harrigan’s and
Spekkens’s terms, ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic, do not for-
malise the informal ideas correctly. In light of the above
analysis, all current no-go theorems for the wavefunction
representing knowledge (such as the PBR theorem, Col-
beck and Renner’s, Hardy’s, Patra et al’s, and Ruebeck
et al’s) actually at best only rule out wavefunction over-
lap, and not the wavefunction representing knowledge as
is usually claimed.
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Appendix - Analogous Concepts
The thermodynamic entropy S of a system is also a
candidate for being both ontic and epistemic. The en-
tropy assigned to a system depends on knowledge of
it. For instance, the entropy assigned to an equally di-
vided box of particles is higher if an observer can distin-
guish these particles than if they cannot [29]. However,
that doesn’t mean either that one entropy is correct and
the other is not, nor that they are both solely expres-
sions of knowledge and so equally ‘correct’ (as would be
analogous to Harrigan’s and Spekkens’s definitions of ψ-
ontology and ψ-epistemicism respectively). Instead, both
represent the system as it is independently of us to some
extent, while also representing what is known about it
[30].
While the ontological models framework considers
pure, rather than mixed states, the latter also seem to
represent both the underlying state of a system and
knowledge of it, to produce overlapping states in the
theory for the same real state of the world. An exam-
ple of this is the singlet state of spin. If we trace out
one subsystem to consider the other, lack of knowledge
about the other subsystem makes the state of each maxi-
mally mixed in every basis, and there is no possible pure
state about which we could be ignorant (because there is
no pure state of one particle’s spin which is empirically
equivalent to the maximally mixed state of spin in every
basis). Despite this, something about the world inde-
pendently of what we know about is represented by the
maximally mixed state because it gives the correct rela-
tive frequencies for measurements on just one particle.10
Caves et al give an account where it is consistent for
different observers to believe a situation represented by
different states, but for all observers to believe the state
pure (though this is for a situation where no underlying
real state is assumed) [31].
Appendix - Issues with an Assumed Underlying
State λ
As mentioned above, there are a number of issues with
the idea of an underlying state assumed by the Ontologi-
cal Models Framework. Classically, points in state space
define exact values for all observables (e.g. a point in
(3+3)-dimensional position-momentum state space gives
the exact position and momentum of an object), so as-
sociating a real possible state-of-the-world to each point
ensures all values are simultaneously single-valued. How-
ever, if we try and say a single point in a state space cor-
responds to a real quantum state-of-the-world, it enforces
locality of hidden variables, so violates Bell’s theorem. 11
Further, there is an issue with representing a projec-
tive measurement in this form, if one assumes all values
are simultaneously single-valued - given, if we assume all
system evolution except measurement is deterministic (as
quantum mechanics does), it implies measurement must
physically disturb the system in a random way to repli-
cate our observations.
Alternatively, this underlying real state could be multi-
valued - variables could have a number of values simulta-
neously. However, this is very similar to the wavefunction
- making us ask (with the exception of to represent an ob-
server’s knowledge above any beyond this), why we need
a wavefunction separate to this underlying state.
Another issue, specifically with the idea of the real un-
derlying state of the world assumed by the ontological
models formalism, is that both the response function for
a variable at an initial state, and the probability that a
situation represented by a given wavefunction being in a
given state, are real probabilities, rather than quasiprob-
abilities - they are always non-negative, and sum addi-
tively. This is unlike quantum ‘probability amplitudes’,
which are really quasiprobabilities - they can be negative
or even imaginary, and so can interfere destructively with
one another. This negative probability interference is a
key part of quantum mechanics, explaining peculiar phe-
nomena such as the sequential Stern-Gerlach experiment
[33], the Elitzur-Vaidman Bomb Detector [34], and coun-
terfactual communication [35, 36] and imaging [37]. It
is unclear how the real non-negative probabilities of this
real underlying state-of-the-world could replicate these
effects - casting doubt on this framework.
Oldofredi et al discuss additional issues with this un-
derlying real state assumption in [38].
10 Similarly, if we believe a state is an equal mix of |↑〉x and |↓〉x,
but it is actually the pure state |↑〉z , neither the mixed or pure
state would wrongly describe the results of an x-measurement:
they would just reflect differing knowledge of the system.
11 The only major interpretation of quantum physics in which this
is not the case is in Bohmian mechanics, where the state-of-
the-world would pin down the quantum potential - but exis-
tence as real values would reinforce the nonlocality-vs-special-
relativity issue (as information sent nonlocally would definitively
be writ onto the state-of-the-world, so this nonlocal communi-
cation would be, to use Shimony’s terms, action, rather than
passion, at a distance [32]).
